Three-Point-For-Win in Soccer: Are There Incentives for Match Fixing?
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SSRN Working Paper, 2010.
A companion piece to my work on the three-point-for-a-win rule: I test whether the rule creates incentives for collusion among teams of similar strength, particularly in lower-quality leagues with weaker media scrutiny and governance. Evidence from the Ukrainian league is consistent with a specific cooperation scheme — winning at home and conceding away — that inflates the total points collected by colluding pairs of teams relative to what genuine competition would produce.
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A companion piece to my work on the three-point-for-a-win rule: I test whether the rule creates incentives for collusion among teams of similar strength, particularly in lower-quality leagues with weaker media scrutiny and governance. Evidence from the Ukrainian league is consistent with a specific cooperation scheme — winning at home and conceding away — that inflates the total points collected by colluding pairs of teams relative to what genuine competition would produce.
A companion piece to my work on the three-point-for-a-win rule: I test whether the rule creates incentives for collusion among teams of similar strength, particularly in lower-quality leagues with weaker media scrutiny and governance. Evidence from the Ukrainian league is consistent with a specific cooperation scheme — winning at home and conceding away — that inflates the total points collected by colluding pairs of teams relative to what genuine competition would produce.
Working paper: SSRN Working Paper, 2010.